Root vs custom ROMs
Don't shoot me, I know there's info out there but it's a little much for an Android noob.
From what I'm getting, the X can (eventually) be rooted, just can't have custom ROMs bc the bootloader is locked, right? So basically, once someone roots the thing, you can remove bloatware, use wireless tether, etc and just not load a custom ROM? Am I totally misunderstanding how this works?
And if I missed this somewhere else, fell free to call me a noob and tell me to search the forum. And call me names. But hey, leave my mom out of it!
- 07-19-2010, 12:24 PM #2
okay n00b. Root gives you admin access to the device. Stuff that motorola and verizon don't want you accessing. I would say you have a pretty good idea of it without being too technical. You can download apps that require root access from the market. eg. Titanium.
There are some rumors about that the eFuse won't actually brick the device. I saw on another not-to-be-named forum that some guy bought Koush (an Android developer who, if anyone, has a good chance at rooting) a DroidX. So we shall see in due time.
Edit: now go search the forum. And Google.
Thanks! I'm at work and limited to what sites I can browse, so I'm limited to my poor, overworked and underperforming BB. Is the locked bootloader what prevents (impedes?) the device from being rooted, or just from loading a custom ROM? I'm under the impression it just keeps you from loading ROMs, but getting root access is different.
PS: Thanks for leaving my mom out of it.
- 07-19-2010, 12:43 PM #4
- 07-19-2010, 01:18 PM #6
- 07-19-2010, 01:23 PM #7
- 07-19-2010, 01:24 PM #8
- 07-19-2010, 01:40 PM #10
Assuming 128bit or 256bit AES Encryption, cracking will not happen anytime soon:
For cryptographers, a cryptographic "break" is anything faster than an exhaustive search. Thus, an XSL attack against a 128-bit-key AES requiring 2100 operations (compared to 2128 possible keys) would be considered a break. The largest successful publicly-known brute force attack has been against a 64-bit RC5 key by distributed.net.
Unlike most other block ciphers, AES has a very neat algebraic description. In 2002, a theoretical attack, termed the "XSL attack", was announced by Nicolas Courtois and Josef Pieprzyk, purporting to show a weakness in the AES algorithm due to its simple description. Since then, other papers have shown that the attack as originally presented is unworkable; see XSL attack on block ciphers.
During the AES process, developers of competing algorithms wrote of Rijndael, "...we are concerned about [its] use...in security-critical applications." However, at the end of the AES process, Bruce Schneier, a developer of the competing algorithm Twofish, wrote that while he thought successful academic attacks on Rijndael would be developed someday, "I do not believe that anyone will ever discover an attack that will allow someone to read Rijndael traffic."
On July 1, 2009, Bruce Schneier blogged about a related-key attack on the 192-bit and 256-bit versions of AES, discovered by Alex Biryukov and Dmitry Khovratovich, which exploits AES's somewhat simple key schedule and has a complexity of 299.5. This is a follow-up to an attack discovered earlier in 2009 by Alex Biryukov, Dmitry Khovratovich, and Ivica Nikolić, with a complexity of 296 for one out of every 235 keys. Another attack was blogged by Bruce Schneier on July 30, 2009 and released as a preprint on August 3, 2009. This new attack, by Alex Biryukov, Orr Dunkelman, Nathan Keller, Dmitry Khovratovich, and Adi Shamir, is against AES-256 that uses only two related keys and 239 time to recover the complete 256-bit key of a 9-round version, or 245 time for a 10-round version with a stronger type of related subkey attack, or 270 time for a 11-round version. 256-bit AES uses 14 rounds, so these attacks aren't effective against full AES.
In November 2009, the first known-key distinguishing attack against a reduced 8-round version of AES-128 was released as a preprint. This known-key distinguishing attack is an improvement of the rebound or the start-from-the-middle attacks for AES-like permutations, which view two consecutive rounds of permutation as the application of a so-called Super-Sbox. It works on the 8-round version of AES-128, with a computation complexity of 248, and a memory complexity of 232.
In July 2010 Vincent Rijmen published an ironic paper on "chosen-key-relations-in-the-middle" attacks on AES-128
- 07-19-2010, 01:45 PM #11
- 07-19-2010, 02:27 PM #13
- 07-19-2010, 03:08 PM #14
- 07-19-2010, 03:15 PM #15
99.9 of encryption bypassing today is done by someone at a company wanting a toy to work their way and giving important development info to some hacker.
So considering Motorola is an American company and the Milestone not selling well in America. My guess is someone at Motorola having a DX but wanting cool ROMs will eventually feed a ROM cooker with the Encryption info.
- 07-19-2010, 03:16 PM #16
- 07-19-2010, 03:23 PM #17
- 07-19-2010, 03:28 PM #18
If it were me, the RSA key would be unique to that machine and only a very few would be able to extract the private portion, so any leaking of keys would result in me firing a couple of people.
- 07-19-2010, 03:55 PM #19
- 07-19-2010, 04:10 PM #21
Personally, I think the whole thing stinks. Moto needs to remember that their Android users pulled them up out of the grave, and treat them a little better. The Droid is proof that a strong dev community can keep a phone in the spotlight for 10 months.
- 07-19-2010, 04:29 PM #22