- May 27, 2011
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If anyone has access to a bionic test unit; pretty please check for a relatively easy to access, unused connector visible after removing the battery cover and/or battery as well.
This may be a JTAG connector. Joint Test Action Group - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Huhwut...I'll back up a bit.
Its kind of a continuation of the earlier hypervisor thread http://forum.androidcentral.com/droid-bionic/95895-could-bionic-running-type-1-baremetal-hypervisor.html
I've been guessing at the hows and whys behind a typical IT department's (corporate or government) implementation of their projects on a hypervisored bionic from Motorola/Verizon.
IT departments are going to want a lockable device, its just that they will want the ability to install their own locks.
Let's say BigMedTechCorp's executives and IT department know that their project to provide wireless access to patient data via bionics and future devices has very real financial liabilities for any breach of that data under HIPAA law.
Maybe Motorola will get a contract by telling BigMedTechCorp "Our bionic and future devices are perfectly locked down and of course we won't mind issuing you a certificate of insurance naming BigMedTechCorp as an additional insured on our corporate liability policy, thereby obligating us to pay for any breech."
Maybe Verizon will get a contract by telling BigMedTechCorp "Our firmware over the air updates function flawlessly and of course we won't mind issuing you a certificate of insurance naming BigMedTechCorp as an additional insured on our corporate liability policy, thereby obligating us to pay for any breech."
Yeah, right.
The only financially viable option where Motorola/Verizon get a contract from BigMedTechCorp is by being net neutral, and just providing a blank slate area in the bionic and future devices where BigMedTechCorp can install their own OS, apps, and security.
Now how does BigMedTechCorp take it from here.
While IT departments like "virtualization" in everything they touch, the executives that ride herd on them like something else. They call it "trusted computing" even though there is nothing trustworthy about it; reality is that it just requires things to be implemented in a way that leaves an all important audit trail.
Time to mention that TI's omap chips have been able to boot from microSD since at least OMAP3. Examples Gumstix small open source hardware Gumstix Developer Site
Now the default firmware can be set to disallow booting from microSD, but this default can be reset through a JTAG connection. Note: some googling seemed to indicate that OMAP booting from microSD could be enabled via usb if the firmware allowed it, but JTAG could enable microSD booting even if the firmware didn't allow it.
So the scenario goes like this:
All the bionics BigMedTechCorp buys do NOT have to be shipped to headquarters then resent around the world. Instead, hypervisored bionics go directly to end users in a blank slate state but with booting from microSD disabled in firmware by default.
The IT department at HQ creates bootable microSD cards with the OS, apps, and security that BigMedTechCorp wants to deliver to its users. Then trusted people are given access to these cards as well as a JTAG (or possibly usb) cable along with an app that allows them to go out to the troops, insert the cards in their blank bionics, plug in the JTAG (or usb), and install the official corporate system into the bionic.
Code in the bootable microSD could log all installs as well as call HQ during each install maintaining the audit trail every step of the way.
Best guess would be that motodev will start issuing bionic kits with hints on creating bootable microSD as well as microSD boot enabling JTAG (or usb) cable/application combos.
This may be a JTAG connector. Joint Test Action Group - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Huhwut...I'll back up a bit.
Its kind of a continuation of the earlier hypervisor thread http://forum.androidcentral.com/droid-bionic/95895-could-bionic-running-type-1-baremetal-hypervisor.html
I've been guessing at the hows and whys behind a typical IT department's (corporate or government) implementation of their projects on a hypervisored bionic from Motorola/Verizon.
IT departments are going to want a lockable device, its just that they will want the ability to install their own locks.
Let's say BigMedTechCorp's executives and IT department know that their project to provide wireless access to patient data via bionics and future devices has very real financial liabilities for any breach of that data under HIPAA law.
Maybe Motorola will get a contract by telling BigMedTechCorp "Our bionic and future devices are perfectly locked down and of course we won't mind issuing you a certificate of insurance naming BigMedTechCorp as an additional insured on our corporate liability policy, thereby obligating us to pay for any breech."
Maybe Verizon will get a contract by telling BigMedTechCorp "Our firmware over the air updates function flawlessly and of course we won't mind issuing you a certificate of insurance naming BigMedTechCorp as an additional insured on our corporate liability policy, thereby obligating us to pay for any breech."
Yeah, right.
The only financially viable option where Motorola/Verizon get a contract from BigMedTechCorp is by being net neutral, and just providing a blank slate area in the bionic and future devices where BigMedTechCorp can install their own OS, apps, and security.
Now how does BigMedTechCorp take it from here.
While IT departments like "virtualization" in everything they touch, the executives that ride herd on them like something else. They call it "trusted computing" even though there is nothing trustworthy about it; reality is that it just requires things to be implemented in a way that leaves an all important audit trail.
Time to mention that TI's omap chips have been able to boot from microSD since at least OMAP3. Examples Gumstix small open source hardware Gumstix Developer Site
Now the default firmware can be set to disallow booting from microSD, but this default can be reset through a JTAG connection. Note: some googling seemed to indicate that OMAP booting from microSD could be enabled via usb if the firmware allowed it, but JTAG could enable microSD booting even if the firmware didn't allow it.
So the scenario goes like this:
All the bionics BigMedTechCorp buys do NOT have to be shipped to headquarters then resent around the world. Instead, hypervisored bionics go directly to end users in a blank slate state but with booting from microSD disabled in firmware by default.
The IT department at HQ creates bootable microSD cards with the OS, apps, and security that BigMedTechCorp wants to deliver to its users. Then trusted people are given access to these cards as well as a JTAG (or possibly usb) cable along with an app that allows them to go out to the troops, insert the cards in their blank bionics, plug in the JTAG (or usb), and install the official corporate system into the bionic.
Code in the bootable microSD could log all installs as well as call HQ during each install maintaining the audit trail every step of the way.
Best guess would be that motodev will start issuing bionic kits with hints on creating bootable microSD as well as microSD boot enabling JTAG (or usb) cable/application combos.
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